What is CVE-2026-46242?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.
Timeline
- 2026-05-30Published to the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-07-04First covered in a defend.network daily briefing
- 2026-07-22NVD record last updated
Affected product
Linux Kernel
Remediation Steps
- Apply the vendor security update for Linux Kernel as a priority.
- Restrict network exposure of the affected service to trusted sources until patched.
- Review logs and detections for indicators of exploitation.
- Confirm fixed versions against the official vendor advisory before deploying.
References
Referenced in our briefings & reports
- Vulnerability Priority Report – Week 1 of July 2026 (July 6 – 12)
- Vulnerability Priority Report – Week 5 of June 2026 (June 29 – July 5)
- North Korea PolinRider expands to 108 packages; Avalon ransomware framework emerges (2026-07-06)
- North Korea targets npm, Linux kernel RCE, AI-driven ransomware surge (2026-07-05)
- Linux kernel RCE, FatFs firmware flaws, North Korea npm malware (2026-07-04)
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